Moscovici réaffirme sa volonté de mettre fin à l’évasion fiscale (5 juillet)
L’ATAP va-t-il ajouter de l’huile sur le feu ?
Europe’s Anti Tax Avoidance Package: adding fuel to the fire?
Une déclaration de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES/ETUC) : deux pas en avant, deux pas en arrière :
Les « avantages fiscaux belges » (Belgian loopholes) dans le brouillard après l’ATAP, déclare le gouvernement belge ! :
160129 Intérêts notionnels
Rien non plus au niveau européen, sur le problème dit des « inversions » – fusion d’une société mère (notamment aux USA de Pfizer et ici Johnson Controls) avec une autre société, domiciliée dans un pays à basse fiscalité, pour réduire ainsi les impôts à payer …
Belle déclaration dans le même temps de JC Juncker en faveur d’une CBCR publique ainsi que de G.Osborne, félicité par EPSU (syndicat des services publics européens), qu’en pensent les autres commissaires ? Rendez-vous le 12 avril pour la suite du feuilleton … !
voir aussi celle de G.Osborne (UK) et les commentaires de Tax Justice Network :
TJN calls for public country by country reporting. A few hours later . . .
la conférence de presse :
l’agenda fiscal de la Commission 2015-2017 :
et les documents du paquet fiscal (ATAP) :
Pour Eurodad, ceci n’empêchera pas l’évasion fiscale des STN :
voir ici une analyse plus détaillée :
ATAP Briefing Eurodad (2)
et articles de presse :
In NL, the Dutch financial times heavily attacked the plans in a front page article, with various tax advisors saying this was bad for the EU and for NL. Mainly because the EU is going beyond the OECD package with CFC rules, a switchover clause and a general anti-abuse rules, and this will put the EU at a competitive disadvantage.
Grant Thornton tax expert Peter Vale said the proposals being announced today did not pose any danger to Ireland. « They’re not going for the more difficult areas today, » he said. « For example the matter of taxation of intellectual property is not included today. » (com F.Weyzig)
Toujours en Irlande :
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/europe-letter-europe-begins-to-take-steps-against-aggressive-corporate-tax-planning-1.2512772 from today’s Irish Times
‘The package will not include details of the revised CCCTB, which is instead expected to be launched in the autumn. What will be significant for Ireland is whether any of the measures go beyond the standards of the OECD rules agreed last year.
As Ireland and other countries are always quick to point out, most taxation issues in the EU are sovereign matters, and any change to tax legislation needs unanimous agreement by member states. Today’s proposals represent only the first stage in the legislative process, and it will need to be agreed by all 28 EU members.
There is also a sound argument that a global challenge such as multinational taxation needs a global response, not just an EU one. Nonetheless, today’s announcement is another sign of an international political will to tackle the practice of aggressive corporate tax planning.’
une publication du « document de travail » par le « Financial Times » :
Cette directive sera complétée par une proposition de directive CCCTB pour la fin de l’année et une proposition de CBCR publique par la DG Fisma en avril. Ceci n’exigerait dès lors pas l’unanimité au Conseil .
Les commentaires à chaud de Francis Weyzig (Oxfam-NL) :
With some input from others, I’ve become aware of some more major shortcomings in the ATAD proposal (FT leaked version). It seems especially the CFC clause & switchover rule are full of loopholes.
1) The proposal includes an exit tax, but no anti-inversion rules. The exit tax covers the transfer of assts, such as intangible property or shares, out of the EU. That’s one of the few highlights of the proposed directive, because it seems useful against eg. shifting intellectual property into tax havens and goes beyond the OECD BEPS package. However, the exit tax does not cover corporate inversions. This is really a major loophole. A corporate inversion means that a multinational adds a new parent company on top of the existing one, in this case to transfer the ultimate parent company out of the EU. The same thing is currently much in vogue among US firms to escape US CFC rules. It usually involves a takeover of a smaller firm headquartered in a third country. The takeover is then legally structured in such a way that the former parent company of the smaller acquired firm becomes the parent company of the combined firm, and the former parent company of the larger acquiring firm becomes a subsidiary. Hence the name inversion. After this, the multinational can transfer assets held in tax havens, such as trade marks, or entire tax haven affiliates, in such a way that they are no longer (indirectly) owned by EU entities but fall directly under the new parent company. This way, the multinational can entirely avoid CFC rules and the switchover clause, because these apply only to income from entities that are held via EU countries. In most cases, an exit tax will be insufficient to prevent this, because an exit tax only works against the transfer of shares in a tax haven subsidiary that are directly held by an EU entity. (You can guess what companies will do as soon as they see the ATD proposal: insert a layer between EU entities and directly held tax haven subsidiaries, just in case…)
2) There are opportunities for arbitration between CFC rules and the switchover clause, two alternative types of home country taxation. Remember, CFC rules apply to some types of undistributed profits of low-taxed foreign subsidiaries and use the effective tax rate to determine if a subsidiary is low-taxed; the switchover clause applies to all distributed profits of low-taxed foreign subsidiaries (and joint ventures) and applies the statutory tax rate to determine if an entity is low-taxed. Some low-taxed foreign profits are not covered by CFC rules, such as profits from intra-group trade in goods. If that is the case, a multinational can simply keep the profits abroad to avoid application of the switchover clause. However, an opposite situation is also possible. Assume for example that the profits of a subsidiary fall under a regime like the one Luxembourg has for royalty income: a normal statutory tax rate applies (29% in LU), but only on a small part of the actual profits (80% of royalty income is exempt in LU), resulting in a low effective tax rate (just below 6% in the case of LU). Because of the normal statutory tax rate, the switchover clause does not apply. A multinational can then distribute the profits up to the EU parent to avoid application of the CFC clause. An easy solution to ensure that CFC rules cannot be avoided this way is to make CFC rules apply to both distributed and distributed income. Application of the switchover clause can then be limited to distributed income from non-controlled joint ventures and subsidiaries whose main types of income are not covered by CFC rules.
3) In the ATAD proposal, there’s nothing about closing harmful patent boxes. The third country strategy, another part of the package that will be released tomorrow, mentions that member states have already agreed to implement the OECD scriteria for patent boxes, implying that the EC does not have to arrange that through a directive anymore. But that makes no sense, most EU countries have also agreed to implement OECD-style confidential CBCR and still the EC proposes to arrange that via a directive too (DAC4). Moreover, unharmonised phasing out of harmful patent boxes is very likely to distort the internal market, because some EU member states are adjusting their regimes more quickly then others. The UK will probably not phase out the harmful features of its patent box before 2021, while the Netherlands has indicated it will bring its innovation box in line with the OECD criteria by end-2016, for instance.
Best regards, Francis
une interview sur les « intentions » et la bonne volonté affichée par Pierre Moscovici